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Abstract   
 
Regulations allow market makers to short sell without borrowing stock, and the 
transactions of a major options market maker show that in most hard-to-borrow 
situations, it chooses not to borrow and instead fails to deliver stock to its buyers.  Some 
of the value of failing passes through to option prices: when failing is cheaper than 
borrowing, the relation between borrowing costs and option prices is significantly 
weaker.  The remaining value is profit to the market maker, and its ability to profit 
despite the usual competition between market makers appears to result from a cost 
advantage of larger market makers at failing. 
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The market for short exposure in the United States clears differently from the 
market for long exposure.  This difference has attracted considerable recent interest from 
both the SEC and market participants who frequently short-sell or whose stock is sold 
short.1  The interest is in both the economics of clearing and in the pricing of the affected 
assets, which could be high or inefficient.  Our goal is to establish the role and economic 
significance of an unfamiliar but important clearing tactic: failing to deliver. 
Short sales are usually accomplished through equity loans.  The short-seller 
borrows shares from an equity lender which he delivers to the buyer.  This debt of shares 
to the lender gives him short exposure going forward.  But there is another way to create 
the same exposure: by failing to deliver the shares.  If the short-seller delivers nothing to 
the buyer, thereby incurring a debt of shares to the buyer, this also gives him short 
exposure going forward.  This alternative moves the risk that the short-seller does not 
repay his debt from the equity lender to the buyer, but just as equity lenders have a 
mechanism for ensuring performance, i.e. collateral, so does the buyer.  The clearing 
corporation intermediating the trade takes margin and marks it to market, thereby 
defending buyers against their sellers’ non-performance.  If equity loans are expensive, 
unavailable, or unreliable, as research shows they can be (e.g. D’Avolio, 2002, Geczy, 
Musto and Reed, 2002, Jones and Lamont, 2002, Lamont 2004) then this alternative 
appears desirable, to short sellers if not to buyers.  But considering the market rules that 
bind short sales to equity loans, how is it feasible? 
                                                 
1 In July of 2004 the SEC passed regulation SHO which limits the ability of certain market participants to 
sell stock short without borrowing to cover their position.  The discussion period for regulation SHO 
attracted considerable attention from the business press. 
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The answer, we show, lies in the special access to delivery fails that option 
market-makers enjoy.  Traders are generally obliged to locate shares to borrow before 
shorting, but those engaged in bona-fide hedging of market-making activity are exempt 
from this requirement.  So unlike traders in general, a market maker can short sell 
without having located shares to borrow.  If he does not locate shares to borrow then he 
fails to deliver, someone on the other side fails to receive, and therefore retains the 
purchase price, and the clearing corporation starts taking margin.  While it lasts, this 
arrangement is effectively an equity loan from the buyer to the seller at a zero rebate.  But 
whether it lasts depends on the reaction of the trader being failed to.  If a buyer does not 
get his shares then he can demand them, in which case a short-seller who failed is bought 
in: he must go buy the shares and hand them over.  If that short-seller wants to maintain 
his short exposure he must short again, so this demand increases his shorting cost by this 
roundtrip transactions cost.  Thus, the cost of failing to deliver is the cost of a zero-rebate 
equity loan plus the expected incidence of buy-in costs.  If this incidence is low enough, 
then failing is a valuable alternative to borrowing the harder-to-borrow stocks. We show 
that the alternative to fail is valuable and key to the pricing and trading of options. 
First, we show that shorting costs move options out of parity.  That is, synthetic 
shorts constructed from options trade below spot-market prices when shorting is costly, 
i.e. when interest rebates on equity loans are low, and this disparity grows as the rebate 
falls.  However, this growth slows when the rebate falls below zero, consistent with 
option market-makers choosing failure over negative rebates, and sharing some of the 
savings.  Furthermore, the short interest of a major option market maker grows, as a 
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fraction of marketwide short interest, as rebates fall, consistent with the market maker 
having and sharing an advantage getting short exposure to hard-to-borrow stocks. 
We can see the advantage directly in the market maker’s shorting experience.  
Half the time the market maker shorts a hard-to-borrow stock, it fails to deliver at least 
some of the shares.  And it never accepts a negative rebate, always choosing to fail 
instead.  This advantage could in principle be offset by frequent buy-ins, but we find a 
very low frequency of buy-ins, executed with small price concessions. 
How much of this advantage does the market maker share?  Estimating the market 
maker’s trading profits, net of rebate reductions and buy-ins, we document a significant 
average profit.  This profit seems at odds with the competitiveness of options markets, 
but we show that it corresponds to the way the clearing corporation handles buy-ins.  The 
highest-volume option market makers, such as our data supplier, likely benefit from the 
clearing corporation’s practice of assigning buy-ins to the oldest fails.  That is, when a 
number of short-sellers’ brokers are failing on the same stock and a buyer’s broker 
demands shares, the clearing corporation passes this demand to the broker whose fail 
started first.  This favors the few highest-volume traders because, since their portfolios 
turn over so much, their fails are rarely the oldest.  Thus, we hypothesize that option-
market competition tends to oligopoly as stocks grow hard to short. 
 To test our hypothesis that market-maker competition weakens as specialness 
grows, we test whether options’ bid/ask spreads grow as specialness grows.  We find that 
they do.  We also find that our data provider, a large market maker, is bought in much 
less frequently than average, and that when it is bought it in, this corresponds to when 
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option volume is lower, and therefore its advantage at avoiding buy-ins is smaller. We 
therefore conclude that at least some of the profits result from limits to competition.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section I reviews the literature, 
Section II describes the database, Section III presents the results and Section IV 
concludes.  An appendix provides background information and relevant details regarding 
short selling and delivery. 
 
I. Related Literature 
This paper is not the first to document that shorting frictions associate with 
breakdowns of put call parity.  Lamont and Thaler (2001) find that impediments to short 
selling prevent traders from exploiting seemingly profitable arbitrage strategies resulting 
from the misalignment of stock prices in equity carve-outs. Similarly, Ofek, Richardson 
and Whitelaw (2004) measure the relationship between increased borrowing costs and 
put-call disparity and find cumulative abnormal returns for arbitrage strategies involving 
put-call disparity exceed 65%.  But, as in Jarrow and O’Hara (1989), market 
imperfections prevent most arbitrageurs from turning the misalignment into a profit. The 
put-call parity trades studied here can only be performed by market participants who can 
always borrow stock or short sell without borrowing stock.  In other words, rebate rates 
are only valid if stocks are found and borrowed.  Our study has the unique advantage of a 
coherent approach that combines actual borrowing costs and feasibility for one market 
participant: a large options market maker. 
Furthermore, this paper is not the first to discuss settlement fails; there is a strand 
of literature which studies settlement and settlement failures in markets other than U.S. 
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equities.  In the context of monetary policy, Johnson (1998) finds that technological 
improvements in the banking settlement system have affected monetary policy.  In the 
context of foreign exchange, Kahn and Roberds (2001), show that settlement through a 
private intermediary bank can mitigate some of the unique risks associated with foreign 
exchange settlement.  Fleming and Garbade (2002) find that settlement fails jumped 
following the September 11th attacks as a result of the destruction of communication 
facilities.2 
In this paper, we identify the possibility of profiting from the misalignment, due 
to short-sale costs, of stock and options markets for market participants who have the 
option to fail to deliver shares, and we show how limited access to this option is a barrier 
to entry that prevents competition from realigning market prices.  This work relates 
primarily to three topics in the finance literature: equity lending, the relation of observed 
prices to Black-Scholes, and deviations from put-call parity. We briefly review each. 
 
A. The Equity Lending Market. 
 A number of recent papers have examined variation in the cost of borrowing stock 
in the equity lending market.  Reed (2002) uses one year of daily equity loan data to 
measure the reduction in informational efficiency resulting from short-sale costs.  Geczy, 
Musto and Reed (2002) measure the impact of equity-loan prices on a variety of trading 
strategies involving short selling.  The paper finds prices in the equity lending market do 
not preclude short-sellers from getting negative exposure to effects on average, but in the 
                                                 
2 More recently, Boni (2005) explores market-wide failing data from the clearing corporation. 
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case of stock-specific merger arbitrage trades, short selling impediments reduce profits 
substantially.  Christoffersen, Geczy, Musto and Reed (2005a, 2005b) use the same 
database to study stock loans that are not necessarily related to short selling.  The paper 
finds an increase in both quantity and price of loans on dividend record dates when the 
transfer of legal ownership leads to tax benefits.  Using another database of rebate rates, 
Ofek and Richardson (2003) demonstrate that short selling is generally more difficult for 
Internet stocks in early 2000, and D’Avolio (2002) uses 18 months of daily data to relate 
specialness to a variety of stock-specific characteristics. Jones and Lamont (2002) study 
borrowing around the crash of 1929; the paper finds that hard-to-borrow stocks had low 
future returns. Finally, Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2002) formulate a search model of 
the equity lending market. 
 
B. Predicted and Observed Options Prices. 
By relating short selling to option prices, this paper also contributes to the large 
literature on the difference between Black-Scholes (1973) options prices and observed 
option prices. MacBeth and Merville (1979) and Rubinstein (1985) show that, 
empirically, implied volatilities are not equal across option classes and that deviations are 
systematic.  As in Derman and Kani (1994), these systematic deviations are commonly 
referred to as the volatility smile. Longstaff (1995) shows that the difference between 
Black-Scholes and actual option prices increase with option bid-ask spreads and decrease 
with market liquidity. While Longstaff’s results are contested in later work (i.e. Strong 
and Xu (1999)), he provides a novel approach to testing the impact of market frictions on 
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option prices.  Dumas, Flemming and Whaley (1998) test a range of time- and state-
dependent models of volatility meant to account for observed deviations from Black-
Scholes prices.  The paper concludes that these models still leave a large mean-square 
error when explaining market prices. Using Spanish index options, Peña, Rubio and 
Serna (1999) find evidence consistent with U.S. markets; they find a positive and 
significant contribution of the bid-ask spread to the slope of the volatility smile. Dennis 
and Mayhew (2000) examine the contribution of various measures of market risk and 
sentiment on individual index options and find that both are correlated with the smile.   
 
C. Tests of Put-Call Parity 
Some of the evidence on the impact of short-sale impediments on options prices is 
presented here in terms of put-call parity.  Tests of put-call parity date back to 
Klemkosky and Resnick (1979) who find option market prices to be largely consistent 
with put-call parity. In a related paper that focuses on the speed of adjustment of option 
and stock markets, Manaster and Rendleman (1982) conclude that closing options prices 
contain information about equilibrium stock prices that is not contained in closing stock 
prices. While the implied stock price measure employed in our work differs substantially 
from that of Manaster and Rendleman (1982), the approach of comparing actual and 
implied stock prices is similar.   
 
II. Data 
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We combine several databases in this study.  First, a prominent options market 
maker provided rebate rates, failing positions and a database of buy-ins and execution 
prices on those buy-ins.  For equity options prices, implied volatilities, option volume and 
open interest, we use the OptionMetrics database.  Finally, the interest rate term structure 
is estimated using commercial paper rates from the Federal Reserve (see Appendix B for 
details).   
 
A. Rebate Rates, Fails and Buy-Ins. 
A large options market-making firm has generously provided a database of their 
rebate rates, fails and buy-ins for 1998 and 1999.  The rebate rates are the interest rates 
on cash collateral for stock loans quoted by the market maker’s prime broker.  Different 
borrowers are likely to face different rates; this database is a description of one large 
market maker’s experience.  As discussed in Geczy, Musto and Reed (2002), rebate rates 
allow us to measure the difficulty of borrowing shares, or specialness.   
We construct a measure of specialness for each stock on each date.  Specifically, 
specialness on any stock is the difference between the general collateral rate and the 
rebate rate on that stock.  Following Geczy, Musto and Reed (2002), we estimate the 
general collateral rate as the Federal Funds Rate minus the equity lender’s fixed 
commission.  Specialness is zero for most stocks, and it is positive for specials, or hard-
to-borrow stocks.  In Panel B of Table IV, we augment our market maker’s specialness 
database with specialness from a large custodian lender as described in Geczy, Musto and 
Reed (2002).   
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The rebate rates cover all stocks in the Russell 3000 index, and we have limited 
our other databases to that subset of U.S. equities using constitution lists from the Frank 
Russell Company.  The Russell 3000 includes the 3000 largest stocks in the U.S based on 
May 31st market capitalization. In 1997, stocks larger than $171.7M were included. The 
cutoff was $221.9M in 1998 and $171.2M in 1999.   
The database also indicates when this market maker is failing to deliver shares on 
any of its short positions.  Even though we do not have data on any of this market 
maker’s specific trades, we do have information about this market maker’s buy-ins.  The 
buy-in database has purchase dates, settlement dates and execution prices for every buy-
in 1998 and 1999.   
 
B. Options Data 
We use the Ivy DB OptionMetrics database for US Equity option prices, spreads 
and volume.  We use the average of the lowest closing ask and the highest closing bid, or 
the midquote, as the options price.  We apply three filters that are common elsewhere in 
the options literature (e.g. Dumas, Whaley and Fleming (1998) and Bakshi, Cao and 
Chen (1997)).  First, we remove options with fewer than 6 calendar days to maturity to 
mitigate liquidity bias.  Second, we remove options with prices less than $0.375 to 
minimize price discreteness.  Third, as described in Table I, no-arbitrage restrictions are 
applied to the option quotes.   
Table I indicates that he intersection of the rebate and option databases contains 
19,723,466 observations.  After filtering, the database contains 11,437,401 observations.  
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This is daily price data for options with various strike prices and maturity dates on 
449,721 unique stock/days.  On average, there are 890 stocks per day on the 504 trading 
days in the sample. 
 
III. Results 
 
The empirical results are ordered as follows.  First, we address the significance to 
a market maker of its option to fail, both in the incidence of failing and in the relation of 
failing to high equity-loan costs.  Next, we relate equity-loan costs to the price of a 
synthetic short position as determined by put-call parity, and we ask if this relation is 
sensitive to whether the option to fail is in the money, i.e. whether the rebate rate is less 
than zero.  Then we gauge whether the mispricing of the synthetic short position is a 
result of expensive puts or cheap calls using implied volatility as a measure of price.  We 
then calculate the expected cost of buy-ins, which is the product of the incidence of buy-
ins and their execution quality.  Using this actual incidence and price of buy-ins, we 
compute the market-maker’s net profits from providing synthetic shorts in hard-to-
borrow situations.   Finally, in response to the positive profits we document, we address 
the possibility that option-market competition is limited when the underlying is hard to 
borrow. 
 
 
 
 
A. Specialness and Delivery Failure 
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Our database shows the data supplier’s short position, for each stock in the 
Russell 3000 and each day in 1998-99, and in particular it shows whether the position 
was achieved through borrowing, failing or both.  It also tells us the rebate received on 
borrowed shares, whether failed shares were bought in, and if so, at what price.  Thus, we 
can sort short positions into five major categories: General Collateral, Reduced Rebate, 
Reduced Rebate and Fail, Fail Only and Buy-In.  General Collateral indicates that a 
stock has been loaned at the normal rebate rate; i.e. the stock is easy to borrow. Reduced 
Rebate indicates that the rebate rate is below the general collateral rate; i.e. the stock is on 
special. Reduced Rebate and Fail indicates that some shares have been borrowed at a 
reduced rebate, and that the market maker failed to deliver some shares that were sold 
short. Fail Only indicates that the market maker failed to deliver any of the shares in this 
short position. Buy-In indicates that the counterparty of the short-sale transaction is 
forcing delivery on some or all of the shares in the short position.  Table II, Panel A, 
reports the incidence of each. 
Consistent with earlier work, a large majority, 91.24%, of stocks are available for 
borrowing at general collateral rates. The remaining 8.76% are the specials.  Breaking out 
this 8.76%, we find 4.19% where borrowing simply continues at lower rebates, but in the 
remaining 4.57% the market maker fails to deliver, partially or completely. Failing is thus 
an important part of the story; more than half of the time the option to fail is used when 
stocks are on special. Any analysis of the relationship between short-sale impediments 
and options prices is at least incomplete, and perhaps severely biased, without 
consideration of the option to fail.  
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We would expect options market makers to fail more often as rebate rates fall to 
zero.  Our sample bears this out.  Panel B of Table II shows 89.65% of the failing 
positions occurring when rebates are at the lowest rate in our sample, zero, and only 
1.39% of the non-failing positions have rebates at zero.  So failing predominates when 
rebates hit zero, and delivery predominates when rebates are positive.  We also find, in 
unreported results, that the probability of at least some failure grows 15.66% for each 1% 
decrease in the rebate.3  Thus we conclude that failure is tightly linked to low rebates. 
 
B. Specialness and Option Prices. 
 We expect option prices to reflect the costs of hedging, including the costs of 
short selling.  We use our measure of short-sale costs, specialness, and two measures of 
options prices to characterize this relationship.  First, we use put-call parity to measure 
misalignments of stock and options markets.  Second, we refer to the options’ implied 
volatilities, as calculated in Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979), to gauge whether puts or 
calls are more responsible for what we find. 
 
B.1. Put-Call Parity 
  The effect of short-sale costs on option prices can be seen via the European put-
call parity relation. Put-call parity states that the value of a European call option plus the 
discounted value of the option’s strike price is equal to the value of the underlying asset 
plus the value of a European put with the same strike price and maturity: 
                                                 
3 Taking those observations for which specialness is positive and the rebate rate is positive, we run a 
logistic regression of failing on specialness with cross-sectional and time-series fixed effects.  The 
dependent variable is 1 if there is any failing in a particular stock on a given day.  The coefficient estimate 
on specialness is 0.1455 (p-value < 0.0001).  The odds ratio point estimate is 1.1566. 
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C + e-rτK = P + S 
where C is the price of a European call option on stock S with strike price K, e-rτK is the 
present value of K, and P is a put option with strike price K.  C and P are assumed to 
have the same time to maturity, τ.  
This relationship allows a trader to replicate the payoffs of any single instrument 
in the equation with a combination of the other three instruments.  For example, the stock 
price implied by this put-call parity relationship, or the implied stock price, is 
Si = C - P+ e-rτK. 
For stocks with dividends paid during the life of the option, the present value of 
dividends is added to the right hand side of the equation. 
After computing the stock price implied by put-call parity, we compute the 
percentage deviation of the implied stock price from the actual stock price.  This is 
computed by subtracting the implied stock price from the actual stock price and 
normalizing by the actual stock price: 
tj
i
tjtj
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,
−
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where Sj,t is the price of stock j on day t from the spot market and Sij,t is the price of stock 
j on day t implied by put-call parity.  We refer to ∆j,t as put-call disparity. Table III shows 
the distribution of this measure, which shows some dispersion; the 5th percentile is 
−0.98% and the 95th percentile is 1.95%.   
Some of this dispersion does not relate to arbitrage opportunities.  Dividend-
related early exercise differentiates the European options of the parity relation from the 
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American options of the database;  we address this below by excluding stocks that paid 
dividends in the past year.  Early exercise also arises with deep-in-the-money puts, which 
we address by using only the option pair with moneyness (S/K) closest to one, and 
shortest time to expiration.   Since near-the-money and close-to-maturity options tend to 
be more actively traded, this also mitigates the effects of stale prices, which we further 
address by removing options for which the volume or open interest is equal to zero.   
Another source of dispersion is microstructure effects. As Battalio and Schultz 
(2005) document, end-of-day prices deliver noisy estimates of actual arbitrage 
opportunities, as they may not be prices that were simultaneously available for trade.  
And even if prices are simultaneous and midpoint prices are exactly in line with put-call 
parity, if the stock price were at either an ask or a bid while the options were both at their 
midpoints, put-call disparity for the average stock in our sample would be 0.53%4.  But as 
long as these measurement errors do not correlate with rebates, they do not interfere with 
our tests.  That is, they are as likely to subtract from our measured profits as add to them. 
We test the null hypothesis that short selling is not associated with put-call 
disparity with the following regression: 
 
∆j,t = a + bSpecialnessj,t + cMoneynessj,t + dTime-to-Maturityj,t + ej,t 
where Specialnessj,t  is specialness in stock j on date t.  Moneyness is defined as the stock 
price divided by the strike price and Time-to-Maturity is the number of calendar days to 
                                                 
4 The median bid-ask spread in stocks in our sample is $0.23 (mean $0.25) .  The median stock price in the 
sample is $21.69 (mean $27.04). If put and call prices are midpoints and the stock is at either the bid or the 
ask, then put call parity will be different from zero by 0.23/(2*21.69) = 0.0053. 
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expiration of the option.  We include fixed effects for both time series and cross-sectional 
effects.  Panel A of Table IV reports the fitted model. 
The significantly negative coefficient on Specialness confirms that as specialness 
increases, so does the shortfall of synthetic short from the spot. Thus, specialness passes 
through to option prices, consistent with findings elsewhere.  The new question is 
whether the option to fail passes through to option prices.  Since the option to fail can 
reduce a market maker’s shorting costs when rebates are negative, but not when they are 
positive, its effect would be a weakening of the relation between specialness and option 
prices as rebates go negative.  That is, reducing the rebate from 2% to 1% increases the 
market maker’s shorting cost by exactly that much, as failing is not a cheaper alternative 
to borrowing in either case, but reducing it from -1% to -2% increases it less, to the 
extent that market maker is failing rather than borrowing.  To test this hypothesis we need 
to use specialness data that shows when the market rebate is negative, so we use the 
‘custodial’ data instead. 
The test design is the same as before, only that now we focus on just the stocks 
that are currently on special, and we add a regressor Negative Rebate Specialness which 
is zero when the rebate is positive, and is equal to the specialness, i.e. has the same value 
as Specialness, when the rebate is negative.  The null hypothesis is that the coefficient on 
Negative Rebate Specialness is not significantly negative.  The result is in Table IV, 
Panel B. 
The regression rejects the null; the relation between rebates and option prices is 
indeed significantly weaker – at the point estimate, about 50% less - for negative than for 
 17
positive rebates.  This indicates that the option to fail plays a significant role in option 
pricing. 
 
B.2. Distinguishing the Effect on Puts and Calls 
The relation between specialness and synthetic shorts indicates some combination 
of puts growing expensive and calls growing cheap.  To gauge whether one is more 
important than the other, we need to separate puts from calls and relate their prices to 
model.  The testable questions become, are the implied volatilities of the puts 
significantly high, and are the implied volatilities of the calls significantly low? 
For each option, we use implied volatility from OptionMetrics, which uses the 
industry standard Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) binomial tree method for calculating 
implied volatilities.  Using a fixed effects regression, we examine the relationship of 
implied volatilities with the moneyness, time-to-maturity, and specialness as well as 
time-series and cross-sectional fixed effects.  The estimation results from several 
parameterizations of the following regressions are presented in Table V.   
 
σj,timplied = γ0+γ1Moneynessj,t + γ2Time-to-Maturityj,t + γ3Specialnessj,t + ej,t 
 
where moneyness is defined as S/K, and time to maturity is measured in calendar days.  
We include fixed effects for both time series and cross-sectional effects.  Consistent with 
the results for index options from Derman and Kani (1994) and Longstaff (1985), we find 
that the implied volatility of put options increases with moneyness. The coefficient on 
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moneyness for call options is statistically negative but the slope is almost flat. Consistent 
with Bakshi, Cao and Chen (1997), our regression results show that implied volatility 
decreases with time to maturity.  
For puts, both the presence and the magnitude of specialness are statistically 
significant and positive. Thus, we conclude that specialness increases the prices of puts.  
Calls prices do not show this sensitivity; neither the presence or the magnitude of 
specialness has a statistically significant effect on call prices.  Thus, when we separate the 
synthetic short into its components we detect a significant positive effect of specialness 
on the cost of buying puts, and no effect on the revenue from writing calls. 
 
C. Abnormal Profits 
 
C.1. Buy-in Costs. 
 
The other cost of failing, besides the foregone interest from the withheld purchase 
price, is the expected cost of being bought in. When the market maker is bought in, the 
clearing corporation executes the purchase, and the market maker must execute a new 
short sale to restore its position.  Thus, the market maker’s expected buy-in cost is the 
probability of a buy-in times this round-trip cost.  Table II shows that 86 of the 69,063 
failing positions, or 0.12%, were bought in over the 2-year period.  Taking this realization 
as the expected incidence of buy-ins, the expected incidence of buy-in costs is this figure 
times the expected transactions cost, conditional on a buy-in. 
Because the clearing corporation executes the buy-in, execution quality may not be 
optimized, and may therefore be costly to the market maker.  To gauge this other leg of 
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buy-in cost we relate the transaction prices of the 86 buy-ins to prevailing market prices.  
Table VI, Panel A shows that the buy-in trades are executed at prices 0.53% worse than 
the volume weighted average price (VWAP) for the given stock on the buy-in day.  The 
departure from VWAP is statistically significant but even so, if we assume that the 
market maker pays the same 0.53% to put the short back on, the overall expected buy-in 
cost is (0.12%)(2)(0.53%), or 0.1bp.  So the expected buy-in cost is, for our market 
maker at least, vanishingly small. 
 
C.2 Abnormal Profit Strategies 
 
In this section we combine the data on rebate rates and buy-in costs to calculate 
the profitability, to the market maker who provided our data, of providing synthetic 
shorts on hard-to-borrow stocks.  In the section following we consider why the profits we 
document could be available in equilibrium. 
Our profitability measure follows a simple trading strategy, designed to avoid the 
attribution issues documented by Battalio and Schultz (2005).  In particular, we decide 
whether to put on the trade based on whether the stock is on special, not on whether our 
database shows disparity, and then we hold the trade to expiration.  If instead we went in 
and out of the trade depending on the apparent disparity in the data, we would mistake 
some measurement error for profitability. 
We focus on liquid options and reduce the influence of known biases by selecting 
the option pair with maturity as short as possible and moneyness closest to one.  We also 
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reduce the incidence of early exercise bias, without risking any look-ahead bias, by using 
only stocks that didn’t pay dividends in the past year.   
Our database allows us to calculate profits net of the exact shorting costs.  If our 
market maker got a rebate we use that rebate but if they failed we use a rebate of zero.  
Assuming the market maker’s opportunity cost of capital at time t is the risk-free rate r(t), 
and denoting his concurrent rebate for a given stock q(t), the short sale cost paid by the 
borrower on day t can be written r(t)-q(t).  If our data show that a stock was bought in, 
we subtract the cost of the buy-in by subtracting the buy-in price from the stock’s VWAP 
that day.   The assumption is that the market maker keeps the position going by shorting 
anew at VWAP on the same day.  The profits from this strategy can be written as  
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where the position is opened at t=0 and closed at t=T. 
 
We look at the profits to short-selling actual stock and buying synthetic stock 
whenever that stock goes on special. We see in Table VII that such a strategy would 
involve 6086 option pairs and yield an average profit of $0.1346 per trade. The profit is 
statistically significant with a p-value of less than 0.001, and corresponds to $13.46 per 
option contract. Thus, the market maker profits, in equilibrium, by providing these 
synthetic shorts.  In our final section we propose and test a hypothesis for why this 
happens. 
D. Why Aren’t Abnormal Profits Competed Away? 
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 What accounts for the equilibrium profitability we document?  Why aren’t more 
market makers buying these cheap synthetic long positions, bidding them up to zero 
profitability?  We hypothesize that the clearing corporation handles fails in a way that 
favors higher-volume market makers, resulting in weaker competition when stocks grow 
special.  We test this hypothesis on the relation between specialness and quoted spreads. 
 The hypothesis follows from how the clearing corporation assigns buy-ins.  If a 
fail must be bought-in, this buy-in is assigned to the oldest fail (see Appendix A).  
Assuming a higher-volume market maker is more likely to move from a short position to 
flat (or positive) and back again, it is less likely to have the oldest fail and therefore less 
likely to be bought in.  Thus, we hypothesize that higher-volume market makers, such as 
our data provider, enjoy a cost advantage with hard-to-borrow stocks, and that this 
advantage limits competition to make markets in the affected options. 
If our market maker faces lower competition when specialness is higher then its 
market share of short exposure, i.e. its total short position as a fraction of economy-wide 
short interest, should grow as specialness grows. This would suggest that shorting via this 
option market maker, rather than some other way, becomes more attractive as shorting 
constraints tighten.  Regressing the market share (Market Maker’s SI)/(Market SI) on 
Specialness,, we find (p-values in parentheses):  
(Market Maker’s SI) / (Market SI) = -0.06902 + 0.04037*Specialness 
(0.2795) (0.0197) 
 
Market share increases significantly with specialness, indicating that shorting frictions 
encourage shorting via this option market maker, and therefore that shorting frictions 
impose less cost on this option market maker than on traders in general. 
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 So this market maker gains short-interest market share as specialness grows, but 
in principle all option market makers could be gaining short-interest market share.  To 
address the competitiveness between option market makers we need a measure of the 
current competition to make a market in a stock’s options, and the natural candidate is the 
price charged, the current bid/ask spread. 
 Option spreads are subject to limits which often bind.5 The SEC, which sets these 
limits, finds that quoted spreads are at their maxima between 21% and 57% of the time 
(SEC, 2000).  This is consistent with our sample; we find 36% of put options and 32% of 
call options at their maximum spreads.  Thus, the relevant measure of spread width is 
whether it is at the maximum. 
Accordingly, to relate spreads to specialness, we fit a probit model where the 
dependent variable indicates maximum width, and specialness is an explanatory variable.  
To control for demand-side circumstances that could affect spreads, we also include 
trading volume and open interest in the option, time to expiration and distance from at-
the money (i.e. absolute value of 1-S/K).  The result is in Table VIII. 
The probit strongly rejects the null; trading at the maximum spread increases 
significantly with specialness.   Thus, the evidence supports the hypothesis that 
specialness weakens option-market competition. 
                                                 
5 The Securities and Exchange Rule 1014(c)(i)(A) and Advice F-6 prescribe maximum 
quote spreads for equity options.  The rule establishes maximum widths as follows: $0.25 
for options priced between $0.50 and $2, $0.375 for options priced between $2 and $5, 
$0.5 fro options priced between $5 and $10, $0.75 for options priced between $10 and 
$20, and $1 for options priced above $20. 
 23
Another way to test the hypothesis that turnover gives large market makers a cost 
advantage by protecting them from buy-ins is to test whether this advantage dissipates 
when volume drops.  That is, we can test whether our data provider’s success at avoiding 
buy-ins declines when option turnover declines.  We do this by fitting a probit to all fails, 
where the dependent variable is whether (1) or not (0) the position is bought in, and the 
explanatory variables are option turnover (volume over open interest) along with other 
circumstances associated with buy-ins.  What we find, in Table IX, is that turnover is 
significantly negative, as predicted: the less options turn over, the more the position is 
bought in. 
Finally, we can see directly that our data supplier experiences an abnormally low 
incidence of buy-ins on its fails.  On the average day, across the 502 sample trading days, 
this large market maker is failing on 4.4M shares.  This is about 1.75% of the ~250M 
fails on all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks on the average day, in Boni (2005) (see 
Figure 1 of that paper).  In Table II we see that our market maker experienced 86 buy-ins 
across the 502 days, or about 1/6 buy-in per day.  If this is about 1.75% of buy-ins, we 
should see about 10 buy-ins per day.  But the DTCC reports more than 4,300 buy-in 
notices per day,6 and the fraction of notices that result in buy-ins is presumably greater 
than 1/430.  Thus, our data provider’s fails appear relatively unlikely, compared to other 
traders’ fails, to beget buy-ins. 
                                                 
6 This figure represents only the notices transmitted via the DTC’s Participant Exchange service; see 
“DTCC Will Automate and Streamline Buy-In Notification for Securities,” a DTCC press release at 
http://www.dtcc.com/PressRoom/2005/buyin.html 
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IV. Conclusion 
 We show that the option to fail is significant to both the trading and pricing of equity 
options.  We show that it is often in-the-money, and that when it is, market makers profit 
and so do their customers.  The profit to market makers is puzzling, considering their 
competitiveness, but we resolve this puzzle by documenting limits to competition in 
options on hard-to-borrow stocks, and tracing these limits to the clearing corporation’s 
rules for assigning buy-ins. 
 A delivery fail is nearly a single-stock futures contract, the only difference being 
the uncertainty about expiration.  Thus, the popularity of failing may help explain why 
single-stock futures attract so little interest.  The futures can improve on the spot when 
the spot is hard to borrow – this was the major selling point of the futures when they were 
introduced – but in that situation, fails provide the same improvement.  Futures can 
provide other improvements, such as efficiencies with dividends and votes, but these are 
sparse in the fiscal year, unlikely to sustain trading. 
 The popularity of failing and the price improvements it provides short sellers 
encourage us to step back and consider the economic case for delivery.  Delivery 
provides 100% insurance to both sides of a trade; by exchanging cash for securities, 
traders eliminate 100% of their mutual exposure.  100% insurance is unambiguously 
optimal when it is free, but not when it is costly, so the search for efficiency should bring 
traders to a mechanism for buying less insurance at a lower price when delivery is costly.  
This appears to be what they get by failing and margining through the clearing 
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corporation.  So while failing may sound mischievous or abusive, both our results here 
and basic economic reasoning indicate that its role is positive. 
 The SEC has taken a cautious approach by introducing its new Regulation SHO, 
which strengthens delivery requirements for “threshold securities,” those with substantial 
current fails.  Its effect on large market makers such as our data provider is likely small, 
since their hedging trades are still exempt from the locate requirement, and their fails do 
not age much (see Boni, 2005, for a complete description of the regulation), but it has the 
potential to alter the cost of short exposure, so its impact is an important new empirical 
question.  Fortunately the lists of threshold securities are public, so proprietary data may 
not be necessary to answer it. 
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Appendix A.  The Details of Short Selling and Delivery 
 
 Short sellers sell stock they do not own.  In the United States, exchange procedure 
generally requires short-sellers to deliver shares to buyers on the third day after the 
transaction (t+3)7.  Short sellers typically borrow stock and use the proceeds from the 
sale as collateral for the loan.  Additionally, regulators and brokerages impose varying 
margin requirements on short positions.  To close, or cover, the position, the short-seller 
buys shares and returns the shares to the lender. 
 
A. Borrowing and Rebate Rates 
 Typically, a short-seller borrows shares from her broker.  The proceeds from the 
short sale are used as collateral for the stock loan.  The collateral earns interest, and the 
broker returns some of the interest to the short seller.  The interest rate the short seller 
earns is known as the rebate rate.   Rebate rates are generally lower for smaller investors, 
but for a given investor, lower rebate rates indicate more expensive loans.  The majority 
of loans are cheap, but there are a few expensive loans in stock specials8.   
Specials tend to be driven by episodic corporate events resulting in arbitrage 
opportunities for short-sellers. (See Geczy, Musto and Reed (2002) or D’Avolio (2002) 
for examples).  Well placed investors, such as hedge funds, will be able to borrow stock 
specials and will earn the reduced rebate. 
 
                                                 
7 See Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu (2004) for a description of short selling in other countries. 
8 Fitch IBCA’s publicly available report: “Securities Lending and Managed Funds” estimates that the 
industry average spread from the fed funds rate to the general collateral rate on U.S. Equities is 21bps. 
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B. Short-Selling When Borrowing is Difficult 
 Exchange rules require most market participants to demonstrate that they can 
obtain hard to borrow shares before they short sell9.  Market makers require an 
affirmative determination of borrowable or otherwise attainable shares.  In market 
parlance, the short-seller needs a “locate” before short selling.  However, there is an 
exception to the rule. An example is NASD’s rule 3370(b), which exempts the following 
transactions from the affirmative determination requirement:  “…bona fide market 
making transactions by a member in securities in which it is registered as a Nasdaq 
market maker, to bona fide market maker transactions in non-Nasdaq securities in which 
the market maker publishes a two-sided quotation in an independent quotation medium, 
or to transactions which result in fully hedged or arbitraged positions.”   
 
C. Fails and Buy-Ins 
 If the short sale is made on day t, the short seller’s clearing firm generally delivers 
shares on day t+3.  However, the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) 
procedures state: “each member has the ability to elect to deliver all or part of any short 
                                                 
9 During our sample period, NYSE Rule 440C and NYSE Information Memorandum 91-41 require 
affirmative determination (a “locate”) of borrowable or otherwise attainable shares for members who are 
not market makers, specialists or odd lot brokers in fulfilling their market-making responsibilities. 
Similarly, NASD Rule 3370 and NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Article III, Section 1, Interpretation 04 
Paragraph (b)(2)(a) (See Ketchum, 1995, and SEC Release No. 34-35207), and Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 27542 (AMEX) require affirmative determination of borrowable shares during the period 
treated in the paper (SEC Release No. 34-37773). 
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position.”10  If a clearing firm decides to deliver less than the full amount of shares to its 
buyers, the firm is failing to deliver shares. 
 If the clearing firm fails, the best-case scenario for the short seller is for the 
buyer’s broker to allow the fail to continue as long as the short position is open.  In this 
case, the short seller’s cost of short exposure is the lost interest on the transaction 
amount.  When borrowing shares, the short-seller would also lose the full interest income 
on his collateral in the case of a zero rebate rate.  Economically, a failed delivery is the 
same as delivery of borrowed stock at a zero rebate rate as long as the buyer’s broker 
allows the fail to continue. 
 In the worst-case scenario, the buyer’s broker insists on delivery by filing a notice 
of intention to buy in with the NSCC at t+4 in accordance with NSCC’s Rule 1011.  The 
notice is retransmitted from the NSCC to the seller’s broker on t+5, and the seller has 
until the end of day t+6 to resolve the buy-in liability.  If the seller does not resolve the 
liability, a “buy-in” occurs: the buyer purchases shares on the seller’s account to force 
delivery12. If her position is bought in, the seller may then short sell again to re-establish 
the short position.  In this case, the short seller will pay the execution costs of the buy-in 
and the following short sale every six days13.  Figure A1 shows the sequence of events in 
each scenario.   
                                                 
10 NSCC Procedures, VII.D.2. 
11 The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Customer Protection Rule requires clearing firms to possess 
shares in fully paid accounts. Clearing firms may attempt to acquire shares to be in compliance with the 
SEC’s rule. 
12 The seller’s clearing firm buys shares in a buy-in for NYSE and AMEX stocks, the buyer’s clearing firm 
buys-in shares of NASDQ stocks. 
13 NASD Rule 11810(c)(1)(B) gives buyers the option to buy guaranteed delivery shares, and there have 
been complaints regarding the purchase price of guaranteed shares. A limited supply of guaranteed delivery 
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 The NSCC allocates buy-ins across clearing firms and clearing firms allocate buy-
ins across clients.  Failing clients can protect themselves against buy-ins at both levels.  
Figure A2 shows the institutional structure.  In the first stage, the NSCC ranks clearing 
firms according to the date of failed deliveries, and the NSCC allocates buy-ins to the 
clearing firms with the oldest failed delivery first14.  As a result, clearing firms that 
frequently change from short to long net positions are less likely to be bought in. 
 Once the NSCC allocates buy-ins to a clearing firm, that clearing firm must 
allocate buy-ins among its clients.  Clearing firms have discretion over this second-stage 
of the selection decision, and, unlike the first stage, there are no market-wide rules.   
Anecdotal evidence suggests that clearing firms use their discretion; they allocate a 
disproportionately small number of buy-ins to protected clients. 
                                                                                                                                                 
shares, combined with the transparency of the underlying purpose for the purchase may inflate prices.  
Second, according to NASD Regulation’s general counsel Alden Adkins in Weiss (1998), “there are no 
hard and fast rules dictating the prices at which buy-ins can take place.  But [Adkins] says the prices must 
be ‘fair’ – and that the person who sets the price must be prepared to defend it.” 
 
14 This description provided here is a slight simplification of the actual procedure.  For a more specific 
example of what really happens, assume that N+0 represents the date the Buy-In Notice is filed.  Filing 
such a notice will give the firm higher priority in settlement on the first business day after filing, N+1 and 
on the second business day after filing, N+2, if the long position remains unfilled.  On date N+1, if the 
position remains unfilled, NSCC submits “retransmittal notices” to the firm(s) with the oldest short position 
in the Buy-In stock.  These notices specify the Buy-In liability for the short firm and the name of the long 
firm instigating the Buy-In.  “If several firms have short Positions with the same age, all such Members are 
issued Retransmittal Notices, even if the total of their Short Positions exceeds the Buy-In position.”14  Once 
they receive the retransmittal notice, other settling trades may move them to a flat or even a long position in 
the stock but do not exempt them from their Buy-In liability.  The short firm has until the end of day N+2 
to resolve their Buy-In liability. Before the retransmittal notice is received, a buy-in liability is removed 
once a net long position of sufficient size is established.  
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Appendix B.  Risk-Free Interest Rates 
 
We construct a database of daily risk-free interest rates using Federal Reserve 1, 
7, 15, 30, 60 and 90-day AA financial commercial paper discount rates which we convert 
to bond equivalent yields.15  The risk-free rate corresponding to option maturity is 
calculated by linearly interpolating between the two closest interest rates.  For example, 
the risk-free rate for an option with maturity of 6 days would be calculated by linearly 
interpolating between the 1-day and the 7-day discount rates. 
The method of linear interpolation is an approximation to the true term structure, 
and the error inherent in the approximation is greatest for near-term maturities.  By using 
the rates on commercial paper, the error in minimized relative to rates on T-bills or other 
fixed income instruments that are only reported for greater maturities.  As a check on our 
procedure, we also calculate the risk-free rate with daily GOVPX data on T-bills using a 
procedure similar to Bakshi, Cao and Chen (1997).   The correlation coefficient between 
the 3-month AA financial commercial paper rate and the 3-month T-bill rate reported by 
the Federal Reserve is 0.98.  As a further check, we regress our 3-month commercial 
paper rate on the Federal Reserve’s 3-month T-bill rate from September 1997 to August 
2001.  The intercept is not significantly different from zero, the slope is statistically 
significant (the coefficient is 0.90), and the R2 is 
                                                 
15 Bond Equivalent Yield = (Discount/100)(365/360)/(1-(Discount/100)(Time to Maturity/360)) 
This is equivalent to the yield formula reported in the Wall Street Journal and is commonly used in option 
markets and for debt instruments with maturities of less than one year. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
Buy-In – A situation where shares are purchased in the stock market to insure delivery 
for a buyer to whom shares are owed. 
 
Clearing – The delivery of shares from buyer to seller. A clearing firm provides clearing 
and settlement services for exchange members.  
 
Continuous Net Settlement (CNS) System – An automated book-entry accounting system 
that centralizes the settlement of security transactions for the NSCC. 
 
Delivery Versus Payment (DVP) System – A system allowing delivery and payment to 
be exchanged instantaneously.  DVP is used by market participants for settlements that 
are not automatically handled by CNS. 
 
Failure to Deliver – A situation where the seller does not the give the buyer shares on the 
settlement date.  
 
General Collateral Rate – The prevailing interest rate earned on borrowers’ collateral for 
equity loans. 
 
Guaranteed Delivery – A stock transaction where the seller commits to a settlement date 
and allows the buyer to cancel trade if delivery is not made.  Delivery terms are 
negotiated on a trade-by-trade basis; trades often have non-standard clearing (e.g. t+1)  
 
Locate – An affirmative determination that the short-seller will be able to borrow shares 
to deliver to the buyer.  Affirmative determination may include assurances from a short-
seller that the customer can borrow shares in time for settlement or that the security is 
found on “easy to borrow” lists.  In some situations, market participants must provide a 
locate to the stock market maker before short-selling. 
 
Notice of Intention to Buy-In – An indication to the NSCC that the buyer will force 
delivery of shares.  After the notice is filed, the buyer’s priority for delivery is increased. 
The notice of intention to buy-in can be filed four days after trading if securities are not 
delivered. 
 
National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) – Securities clearing organization 
providing centralized clearing and settlement for the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ.  
 
Hard To Borrow – A situation where stock loans are difficult or expensive. 
Institutionally, certain restrictions apply unless a stock is not hard to borrow.  
 
Rebate Rate – The interest rate earned by borrowers on collateral for equity loans.  
Rebate rates are reduced below prevailing rates when stocks are on special.   
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Retransmittal Notice – The NSCC’s indication to the seller that the buyer plans to buy-in 
shares. A notice of the buyer’s notice to buy-in from the NSCC to the seller. A 
retransmittal notice is sent one day after a notice of intention to buy-in has been sent if 
the buyer has not received shares. 
 
Settlement – The exchange of shares for payment. 
 
Settlement Date -- The date on which payment is made to settle a trade. For stocks traded 
on US exchanges, standard settlement is three days after the trade (t+3). 
 
Short Sale – A transaction where the seller sells shares she does not own. 
  
Specialness – The difference between the general collateral rebate rate and stock-specific 
rebate rate. Specialness is typically zero. A stock is said to be on special if specialness is 
positive.   
 
Street Name – Brokerage or nominee registration as opposed to the direct account holder 
registration.  Securities held in street name can be lent to short sellers with the permission 
of the owner.   
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Table I 
Option Database Filters 
This table presents the number of observations excluded by each filter applied to the 
options database. As in Bakshi, Cao and Chen (1997), we delete observations where call 
prices are higher than the underlying stock prices (C > S).  We delete observations where 
call prices are less than the present value of payoffs if exercised (C < S – PV(K) –
PV(Div)).  We delete observations where put prices are less than the current value of 
exercise (P < K-S).  We delete observations where put prices are above their strike prices 
(P > K).  We also delete options with less than 6 calendar days to maturity or greater than 
180 calendar days to maturity and options with a price less than $0.375. 
  
Filters Filters in Isolation Filters in Sequence 
 Obs. 
Excluded 
% Original 
Excluded 
Obs. 
Exlcluded 
% Original 
Excluded 
Obs. 
Remaining 
% Original 
Remaining 
     19,723,466 100%
C,P < .375 3,564,681 18.07% 3,564,681 18.07% 16,158,785 81.93%
tau > 180 3,866,290 19.60% 3,744,692 18.99% 12,414,093 62.94%
tau < 6 1,074,310 5.45% 533,918 2.71% 11,880,175 60.23%
C > S 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 11,880,175 60.23%
C < S-PV(K) 578,906 2.94% 442,774 2.24% 11,437,401 57.99%
P < K - S 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 11,437,401 57.99%
P > K 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 11,437,401 57.99%
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Table II 
Rebate Rates, Failure and Buy-In Frequency 
This table presents statistics on the 1998-99 rebate rate, fail and buy-in database from a 
large options market maker.  Panel A. shows the overall incidence of five equity loan 
states in the database: General Collateral (GC), Reduced Rebate (RR), Reduced 
Rebate/Fail (RRF), Fail Only (F) and Buy-in (BUY) and the average rebate rate 
associated with each state.  Panel B. shows the percentage of daily stock positions in each 
one of three categories: (i) No Failing, where there are no shares failing delivery, (ii) 
Partial Failing, where there is at least one share failing delivery, and (iii) Failing, where 
every share is failing delivery.  Percentages are based on the total number of 
observations,1,512,000. 
 
Panel A.  Incidence of Loan States in the Database 
Loan 
State 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Average 
Rebate Rate 
GC 1,379,594 91.24 1,379,594 91.24 4.98 
RR 63,343 4.19 1,442,937 95.43 1.72 
RRF 59,322 3.92 1,502,259 99.36 1.50 
F 9,655 0.64 1,511,914 99.99 0.34 
BUY 86 0.01 1,512,000 100 0.00 
 
Panel B. Rebate Rates for Failing and Non-Failing Positions 
 Rebate > 0 Rebate = 0 Rebate < 0 Total 
No Failing 98.61% 1.39% 0.00% 95.43% 
Partial Failing 59.36% 40.64% 0.00% 3.92% 
Failing 10.35% 89.65% 0.00% 0.64% 
Total 96.50% 3.50% 0.00% 100% 
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Table III 
The Distribution of Put-Call Disparity and Specialness 
This table describes the distribution of put-call disparity, specialness and rebate rates in 
the sample of 4,560,217 strike price and maturity matched put-call pairs.  Put-Call 
Disparity is the difference between the stock price and the options implied stock price 
normalized by the stock price, i.e. (S-Si)/S.  Specialness is the difference between the 
general rebate rate and the specific rebate rate for a stock.  Rebate Rate is the interest rate 
on cash collateral in a stock loan. 
 
  Put-Call 
Disparity 
Specialness 
(%) 
Rebate Rate 
(%) 
Average 0.0036 0.48 4.47 
Median 0.0028 0 4.85 
Standard Deviation 0.0179 1.30 1.34 
Minimum -0.9988 -0.07 0 
Maximum 0.5617 5.80 5.80 
5th Percentile -0.0098 0 0 
10th Percentile -0.0053 0 3.00 
90th Percentile 0.0140 1.92 5.33 
95th Percentile 0.0195 4.50 5.40 
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Table IV 
Implied Stock Prices and Short Sales Constraints 
This table presents estimates from a panel regression of the following form: 
∆j,t = a + bSpecialnessj,t + cMoneynessj,t + dTime-to-Maturityj,t + ID(j) + ID(t) + ej,t. 
∆j,t is the put call disparity of stock j on day t.  Specialnessj,t is the difference between the 
general rebate rate on day t and the specific rebate rate for a stock  j on day t. 
Moneynessj,t is the price of stock j on day t divided by the strike price of the option pair.  
Time-to-Maturity is the number of calendar days to expiration of the option.  The ID 
functions represent a fixed effects treatment of both the cross sectional (by stock) and 
time series (by day) effects.  The regression uses one put and one call on each stock every 
day; of the options with the shortest time to maturity, those with moneyness closest to 
one are chosen.  Only option pairs are used where the volume and open interest of both 
the put and the call are non-zero.  Panel B uses borrowing rates from a custodian bank to 
examine the impact of specialness on put-call disparity in both borrowing and failing 
regimes when stocks are on special. An indicator that takes the value of one when rebate 
rates are negative, and zero otherwise,  is interacted with specialness to create a second 
specialness variable:  specialness when rebates are negative, or Negative Specialness.  In 
Panel B, the sample is limited to stocks with positive specialness.  For each regression the 
p-value of the Hausman cross-sectional fixed effects specification test is reported. 
 
Panel A. Market Maker’s Specialness 
Variable           Estimate Std.Dev.   t-Stat    p-Value 
Intercept        -0.0071 0.00166 -4.27 <.0001 
Specialness         0.060017 0.00302 19.86 <.0001 
Moneyness 0.006047 0.000782 7.74 <.0001 
Time-to-Maturity 0.000017 3.292E-6 5.06 <.0001 
R-Square                             0.1548  
Number of Observations           84915  
Hausman Test p-Value <.0001  
 
Panel B: Custodial Specialness and Negative Specialness 
Variable           Estimate    Std.Dev.  t-Stat    p-Value 
Intercept        -0.00278 0.002980 -0.93 0.3511 
Specialness  0.088 0.000156 5.64  <.0001 
Negative Rebate Specialness -0.048 0.000171 -2.83 0.0046 
Moneyness 0.00242 0.002150 1.12 0.2613 
Time-to-Maturity 0.00004 0.000008 5.00   <.0001 
R-Square                                    0.2706    
Number of Observations                29387    
Hausman Test p-Value <.0001    
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Table V 
 Implied Volatilities and Short-Sale Constraints 
This table presents estimation results from a panel regression of the following form: 
σj,timplied - σj,taverage implied = γ0+γ1Moneynessj,t + γ2Time-to-Maturityj,t + γ3Specialnessj,t + ID(j) + ID(t) + ej,t.  
σj,timplied is the implied volatility of a put or a call option for stock j on day t,  and σj,taverage 
implied is the average implied volatility of the put and the call for stock j from day t through 
expiration.  Implied volatilities are calculated using the Cox, Ross and Rubinstein 
binomial tree method.  One put and one call is selected on each stock every day; of the 
options with the shortest time to maturity, those with moneyness closest to one are 
chosen.  This difference is then regressed on Moneyness, Time-to-Maturity and two 
specifications of Specialness: the actual value of specialness and an indicator that takes 
the value of one if the stock has specialness greater than 100 bp, and zero otherwise.  The 
ID functions represent a fixed effects treatment of both cross-sectional (by stock) and 
daily (by day) effects.  The Hausman fixed effects specification test p-value is reported.  
***Indicates Statistical Significance at the 0.1% Level. **Indicates Statistical 
Significance at the 1% Level.  *Indicates Statistical Significance at the 5% Level. 
 
  
 
  Calls Puts 
Intercept 1.05271 *** 1.053132 *** 1.052391 *** 0.927512 *** 0.917619 *** 0.911268 * 
Moneyness -0.03807 ** -0.03803 ** -0.03808 ** 0.092928 *** 0.092066 *** 0.092254 *** 
Time-to-Maturity -0.00066 *** -0.00066 *** -0.00066 *** -0.00084 *** -0.00084 *** -0.00084 *** 
Specialness    -0.02581        0.605971 ***    
100 bp Indicator        0.00033           0.01678 *** 
Observations 84915   84915   84915   84915  84915  84915   
R2 0.6640  0.6640  0.6640  0.6776   0.6782   0.6779   
Hausman <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001   
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Table VI 
Buy-In Execution 
This table presents statistics on the execution of buy ins in 1998 and 1999 for a major 
market making firm.  After merging the database with TAQ, there are 85 buy-in 
observations on 24 unique stocks.  The execution quality of the buy-ins is examined by 
comparing the buy-in prices to the volume-weighted average price (VWAP) over the 
trading day,   (SBUYIN – SVWAP ) / SVWAP.  In Panel A, we report the mean, median and 
standard deviation of the execution costs.  Additionally, we report a t-test of the null 
hypothesis that the difference is zero.  If multiple buy-in events are recorded on a single 
day, the buy-in price used in the calculations is the quantity-weighted execution price.  In 
Panel B, we report the quantity of shares bought-in and the number of trading days from 
buy-in to settlement.  
 
Panel A: Execution Costs 
Mean 0.0053 
Median 0.0028 
Std.Dev. 0.0178 
t-stat 2.75 
p-Value 0.01 
 
Panel B: Buy-In Quantity and Timing 
     
Buy-In  
Quantity  
Trading Days to 
Settlement 
Mean 9,512 3.01 
Median 3,915 3 
Std.Dev. 14,450 0.24 
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Table VII 
 Put-Call Arbitrage Profits 
This table lists arbitrage profits from short selling stock and buying a strike and time to 
maturity matched combination of options to replicate the underlying stock.  The short 
stock, long synthetic stock arbitrage trade is put on whenever the stock is on special, and 
closed at option expiration.  Borrowing costs are included in the profit calculation.  If the 
database indicates a buy-in occurs while the position is open, the short position is closed 
at the indicated buy-in price.  The short-sale is then re-established that day using the 
volume-weighted average price.  There are no positions where the underlying stock paid 
a dividend in the previous year.  Trade duration is the number of days a particular 
position is open.  Signed trade profit indicates the percentage of individual positions with 
positive and negative profits.  The strategy uses one option-pair per stock (the pair that is 
closest to the money and nearest term in maturity). 
 
 N Mean Std. Dev. t-Stat p-Value
Arbitrage Profit 6086 0.1346 0.4579 22.93 <0.001 
 Median Mean    
Trade Duration (in days) 35 47.66    
 Positive Negative    
Signed Trade Profit 67.58% 32.42%    
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Table VIII 
Incidence of Maximum Spreads 
This table presents estimation results from a probit regression of the incidence of 
maximum option quote spreads on specialness and other control variables.  To construct 
the dependent variable, call and put options are matched by underlying stock, time to 
maturity and strike price.  The dependent variable is one if both the put and the call have 
quoted spreads at their maximums, and zero otherwise.  AbsVal(1-Moneyness) is the 
absolute value of [1 – (stock price)/(strike price)].  Volume is the sum of the daily 
volume for the put and the call.  Open interest is the sum of open interest for the put and 
the call. Time-to-maturity is the number of days to the expiration of the option.  Fixed 
cross-sectional effects (by stock) are included in the regression.   
 
Parameter Estimate P-Value Average Marg. Effect 
Intercept -2.5377 <0.0001   
Specialness 1.1680 <0.0001 0.00572 0.4637 
AbsVal(1-Moneyness) 0.1881 <0.0001 0.12462 0.0747 
Volume -0.0001 < 0.0001 267.366 -0.00004 
Open Interest -0.0001 <0.0001 2237.01 -0.00002 
Time to Maturity 0.0003 <0.0001 60.2556 0.0001 
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Table IX 
 Determinants of Buy-Ins 
 
This table presents estimation results from a probit regression of buy-ins on specialness, 
short interest and other potentially predictive variables.  The regression is specified so the 
probability of being bought-in is estimated.  Option turnover is the average ratio of the 
daily volume divided by the current open interest for the put/call pair that is trading 
closest to the money and nearest term in maturity on the underlying stock.  Specialness is 
the cost of short-selling.  Short interest is the monthly total short position in a stock 
reported by the exchanges.  Shares outstanding is the CRSP reported number of total 
shares outstanding on the stock.  Standard deviation is calculated from daily returns over 
the previous six months.   Price Indicator takes the value of 1 for stocks with a closing 
midquotes less than or equal to $5, and zero otherwise.  The sample comprises 64 buy-in 
events and 33201 non-buy-in events.  The reported marginal effect is calculated as the 
average marginal effect for a 1 unit change in all observations in the sample.  *Because 
the option turnover variable is used to test the hypothesis of refreshing the age of the 
market maker’s failure to deliver and thereby lowering the position of the market maker 
on the list of buyin allocations, they hypothesis predicts a negative coefficient.  
Consequently, the p-value for option turnover is from a 1-sided test. 
 
Parameter Estimate P-Value Marg. Effect 
Intercept -3.367 < 0.001  
Option Turnover  -0.287 0.035* -0.0016 
Specialness (%) 0.330 < 0.001 0.0018 
Log(Short Interest) 0.082 0.061 0.0005 
Log(Shares Outstanding) -0.353 < 0.001 -0.0020 
Daily Std. Dev. (6 Months) (%) -0.041 0.086 -0.0002 
Price Indicator (<$5) 4.240 < 0.001 0.0234 
 
 
